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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE EVIDENCE COURSE: THE
“PRELIMINARIES” TO HELPING STUDENTS DEVELOP THE
SKILL OF IDENTIFYING NONHEARSAY

EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED*
“The chief aid to [understanding] is order.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
When the Law Journal kindly invited me to contribute to this special issue
on teaching Evidence, my initial inclination was to write an article about the
need to integrate teaching legisprudence, notably statutory interpretation, into
the Evidence course. I strongly believe that as a general proposition, the
academy does a woefully inadequate job of preparing our students to practice
in the Age of Statutes.2 Moreover, as a course, Evidence is uniquely well
suited as a vehicle for teaching legisprudence. In most contemporary Evidence
courses, the primary focus is on the Federal Rules of Evidence. They not only
govern in federal practice, but in four-fifths of the states the legislature or
judiciary has adopted an evidence code patterned directly after the Federal
Rules.3 Most Articles of the Federal Rules function as self-contained codes.4
In its landmark 1993 decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.,5 the Supreme Court approvingly quoted the late Professor Edward
Cleary’s statement that “[i]n principle, under the Federal Rules no common
law of evidence remains.”6 In Justice Blackmun’s words, “the Rules occupy
* Edward L. Barrett, Jr. Professor of Law, University of California Davis; former Chair, Evidence
Section, American Association of Law Schools.
1. SIMONIDES (c. 475 B.C.), quoted in THE MACMILLAN BOOK OF PROVERBS, MAXIMS,
AND FAMOUS PHRASES 1729 (1965).
2. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (Burton
Stevenson ed., 1982); Edward J. Imwinkelried, A More Modest Proposal Than a Common Law
for the Age of Statutes: Greater Reliance in Statutory Interpretation on the Concept of
Interpretative Intention, 68 ALB. L. REV. 949 (2005).
3. 6 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, Table of State and Military
Adaptations of Federal Rules of Evidence, in WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE (Joseph M.
McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2005).
4. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, Federal Rule of Evidence 402: The Second
Revolution, 6 REV. LITIG. 129 (1987).
5. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
6. Id. at 588 (quoting United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 51–52 (1984)).
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the field.”7 However, Rules 301 on presumption,8 and 501 on privileges,9
create windows to the common law. Those statutes explicitly empower the
courts to continue to evolve those bodies of doctrine by common-law process.
Hence, the statutory scheme affords the teacher a unique opportunity to
contrast jurisprudence with legisprudence.
However, I resisted the temptation to write that article. On several
occasions in the past, I have made my views on that subject clear.10 I feel as
strongly about the need to teach statutory interpretation in Evidence as I ever
have, but I am afraid that I have beaten the subject to death. I probably sound
like a broken record. Further, I would like to think that there is a growing
realization of the need to teach legisprudence in the law school curriculum.
Two of the earlier special teaching issues in this law review included articles
on the wisdom of integrating statutory analysis into teaching Contracts11 and
Criminal Law.12 I was gratified to see that Professor McMunigal’s article on
Criminal Law relied in part on one of my earlier pieces advocating increased
stress in teaching on legisprudence.13 In any event, I concluded that it was
advisable to select a different topic. That topic is the challenge of teaching law
students how to recognize nonhearsay.
II. THE DAUNTING CHALLENGE OF HELPING LAW STUDENTS DEVELOP THE
ANALYTIC SKILL OF DETERMINING WHETHER TESTIMONY ABOUT AN OUT-OFCOURT DECLARATION AMOUNTS TO HEARSAY
Teaching law students how to identify nonhearsay may be the most
daunting pedagogic challenge in the Evidence course. To begin with, each
year law students taking Evidence complain about the difficulty of
distinguishing between nonhearsay and hearsay. To be sure, the students
appreciate the importance of the distinction. It is black letter law that
7. Id. at 587.
8. FED. R. EVID. 301.
9. FED. R. EVID. 501.
10. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Need to Integrate Legisprudence into the Evidence Course,
in TEACHING THE LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM 193 (S. Friedland & G. Hess, eds. 2004); Edward
J. Imwinkelried, Using the Evidence Course as a Vehicle for Teaching Legisprudential Skills, 21
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 907 (2003); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evidence Pedagogy in the Age of
Statutes, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 227 (1991). In part because of those beliefs, the Evidence course
book, which I co-author, places special emphasis on legisprudence. See RONALD L. CARLSON,
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, EDWARD J. KIONKA & KRISTINE STRACHAN, EVIDENCE: TEACHING
MATERIALS FOR AN AGE OF SCIENCE AND STATUTES (4th ed. 1997).
11. H. Miles Foy, III, Legislation and Pedagogy in Contracts 101, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1273
(2000).
12. Kevin C. McMunigal, A Statutory Approach to Criminal Law, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1285
(2004).
13. Id. at 1289 n.13 (citing Edward J. Imwinkelried, Using the Evidence Course as a Vehicle
for Teaching Legisprudential Skills, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 907, 908 (2003)).
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nonhearsay is admissible without the necessity to identify an applicable
hearsay exception while hearsay is admissible only if the proponent can
persuade the trial judge that the testimony falls within the scope of an
exception.14 However, understanding the importance of a distinction does not
make it any easier to grasp the distinction or to apply it in practice. The typical
law student can easily master most of the hearsay exceptions, since for better
or worse, mastery to a large degree consists of memorizing the essential
elements of the foundations for the various exceptions. Many students
struggle, though, in making the threshold determination of whether the
testimony constitutes hearsay in the first instance.
Moreover, Evidence teachers acknowledge the magnitude of the challenge.
Evidence teachers often remark that perennially one of the most disappointing
facets of the students’ performance on the final examination is their frequent
inability to discern that although testimony in an examination question related
to an out-of-court statement, nevertheless the testimony was not hearsay. To
address that problem, many, if not most, Evidence teachers spend a full class
on an extended discussion of the hearsay definition and then devote at least one
additional class session exclusively to analyzing problems posing the question
of whether the proffered testimony constitutes hearsay. Some employ
Professor Morgan’s classic 1946 Summer Term Harvard Law School
examination, including 75 fact situations prefaced by the question, “Which of
the following items is hearsay?”15 Others have developed their own hearsay
drills.16
Finally, trial judges complain loudly about the bar’s lack of understanding
of the narrow scope of the definition of hearsay. Many a trial judge has told
me that he or she hates to preside at a case with a “jack in the box” attorney
who leaps up to object on hearsay grounds whenever the proponent’s question
calls for an out-of-court statement—even when it is patent that the testimony
will qualify as nonhearsay. Of course, if that type of attorney wears on the
judge’s patience, the average juror will similarly find the attorney irritating.
The attorney is wasting the jury’s time by constantly interrupting to interject
hearsay objections and regularly being overruled by a sometimes obviously
exasperated judge.
In sum, every affected constituency—law students, Evidence teachers, and
judges—would likely agree that in Evidence, we must do a better job of
teaching students how to differentiate between hearsay and nonhearsay. Many
trial attorneys have an inadequate understanding of the scope of the hearsay

14. FED. R. EVID. 802–04, 807.
15. JON R. WALTZ & ROGER C. PARK, EVIDENCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 133–37 (10th ed.
2004).
16. CARLSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 457–61 (problems 18–13(a)–(w)).
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definition, and to some extent that reflects the difficulty of the teaching
challenge.
In this short Article, I do not intend to discuss what to teach about the
hearsay definition or how to teach it. Rather, I would like to discuss when to
teach that subject. In general, should the Evidence teacher discuss the hearsay
definition early or late in the course? More specifically, what evidentiary
topics ought to precede that discussion in the Evidence course?
III. THE TEMPTATION TO TEACH THE HEARSAY DEFINITION EARLY IN THE
EVIDENCE COURSE
There are exceptions to the rule,17 but for the most part, Evidence
coursebooks tend to take up the subject of hearsay relatively early.18 For
several reasons, that tendency is understandable.
One reason is that the hearsay coverage tends to be the lengthiest topic in
the course and it makes sense to try to get that topic out of the way early on.
Once the teacher has finished the discussion of that topic, the teacher has a
better sense of how much is left for the rest, residue, and remainder, that is, the
shorter discussions in the course. The typical Evidence coursebook devotes
more pages to the topic of hearsay than to any other subject.19 One coursebook
includes more than 500 pages on the various aspects of the hearsay doctrine.20
Another sets aside almost 350 pages to the topic.21 Especially given the
difficulty of teaching the skill of recognizing nonhearsay, at the beginning of
the course it can be hard to predict how many class hours will have to be spent
on hearsay. Since by far hearsay is the largest topic in the course, it would be

17. RONALD J. ALLEN, RICHARD B. KUHNS & ELEANOR SWIFT, EVIDENCE: TEXT,
PROBLEMS, AND CASES ch. 8 (3d ed. 2002); KENNETH S. BROUN, ROBERT P. MOSTELLER &
PAUL C. GIANNELLI, EVIDENCE: CASES AND MATERIALS ch. 13 (6th ed. 2002); RICHARD O.
LEMPERT, SAMUEL R. GROSS & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE:
TEXT, PROBLEMS, TRANSCRIPTS AND CASES ch. 6 (3d ed. 2000); JACK B. WEINSTEIN, JOHN H.
MANSFIELD, NORMAN ABRAMS & MARGARET A. BERGER, EVIDENCE: CASES AND MATERIALS
ch. 4 (9th ed. 1997).
18. DAVID P. LEONARD & VICTOR J. GOLD, EVIDENCE: A STRUCTURED APPROACH ch. 3
(2004); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES:
TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS ch. 3 (5th ed. 2004); PAUL R. RICE & ROY A. KATRIEL,
EVIDENCE: COMMON LAW AND FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE ch. 4 (5th ed. 2005); PAUL F.
ROTHSTEIN, MYRNA S. RAEDER & DAVID CRUMP, EVIDENCE: CASES, MATERIALS, AND
PROBLEMS ch. 3 (2d ed. 1998); WALTZ & PARK, supra note 15, at ch. 3; OLIN GUY WELLBORN
III, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE RULES OF EVIDENCE ch. 2 (3d ed. 2003).
19. See, e.g., ALLEN ET AL., supra note 17; GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE (2002); ERIC D.
GREEN & CHARLES R. NESSON, PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE (2d ed.
1994).
20. RICE & KATRIEL, supra note 18, at 283–784.
21. DENNIS D. PRATER, DANIEL J. CAPRA, STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & CHRISTINE M.
ARGUELLO, EVIDENCE: THE OBJECTION METHOD 509–850 (2d ed. 2002).
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foolish to leave that topic to the very end of the course. The teacher could
easily run out of time and have to altogether forego the discussion of a number
of important evidentiary topics.
Further, students are eager to reach the topic of hearsay because it is
perhaps the evidentiary doctrine that television and the movies have given
them the most exposure to. By the time they enroll in law school, students
have probably seen several depictions of trials in which an attorney made a
technical hearsay objection to obstruct the search for truth. The experienced
Evidence teacher wants to begin the course with a high level of student
interest, and he or she can do so by capitalizing on the students’ interest in the
topic of hearsay.
Finally, from a selfish perspective, raising the topic of hearsay allows the
Evidence teacher to discuss constitutional law decisions that the teacher finds
intellectually stimulating. In their heart of hearts, most law teachers fancy
themselves as constitutional law scholars, and more than any other evidentiary
topic, hearsay interfaces with constitutional law. Many of the foremost
modern Evidence scholars such as Professors Richard Friedman and Robert
Mosteller write frequently about that interface.22 The Supreme Court’s
celebrated 2004 decision in Crawford v. Washington23 is only the most recent
in a long line of Confrontation Clause24 cases imposing restrictions on the
admissibility of prosecution hearsay.25 The Crawford Court’s theory of
“testimonial statements” can potentially have a broad impact on the general
In addition, there are
admissibility of hearsay in criminal cases.26
constitutional constraints on several other aspects of hearsay doctrine, such as
tacit admissions,27 vicarious admissions,28 and the unavailability standard for
the former testimony hearsay exception.29 Some Evidence coursebooks have
separate chapters discussing the interface between hearsay doctrine and

22. E.g., Richard D. Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford: High Court Decision Restores
Confrontation Clause Protection, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2004, at 4; Robert P. Mosteller,
Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH.
L. REV. 511 (2005).
23. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
25. E.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990);
United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Mancusi v.
Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); Berger v. California, 393 U.S.
314 (1969); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
26. See generally Crawford Symposium, 20-SUM Crim. Just. 5 (2005). The various articles
identify a number of constitutional law issues that are left unresolved after Crawford. Needless to
say, those issues are fodder for class discussion.
27. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617–18 (1976).
28. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135–37 (1968).
29. Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 204.
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constitutional law.30 What would the typical Evidence scholar more enjoy
teaching: the interpretation of the dead men’s statutes or the growing
controversy over the application of Crawford to dying declarations? The
Evidence teacher is probably correct in thinking that the latter topic will lend
itself to a livelier class discussion.31
For all of these reasons, it is tempting for the Evidence teacher to take up
the topic of hearsay, including the recognition of nonhearsay, sooner rather
than later.
IV. THE CASE FOR COVERING THE HEARSAY RULE SOMEWHAT LATER IN THE
EVIDENCE COURSE—THE HELPFUL “PRELIMINARIES” TO ATTEMPTING TO
TEACH THE STUDENTS HOW TO RECOGNIZE NONHEARSAY
The thesis of this Article is that on balance, it is advisable for the Evidence
teacher to turn to the topic of hearsay somewhat later in the course. More
specifically, this Article argues that there are several topics that are natural
“preliminaries” to the discussion of nonhearsay. It is submitted that if the
Evidence teacher covers these topics before shifting to hearsay, his or her
students will be in a markedly better position to master the analytic skill of
making the threshold determination whether testimony about an out-of-court
statement constitutes hearsay. Those four “preliminary” topics are: the
competency of prospective witnesses; the authentication of evidence; logical
relevance, notably non-character theories; and the best evidence rule.
A.

The Competency of Prospective Witnesses

Many Evidence coursebooks cover the topic of witness competency after
the analysis of hearsay.32 However, reversing that sequence can make it easier
for the students to develop the skill of determining whether testimony falls
within the definition of hearsay.
Today the conventional wisdom is that the primary rationale for the
hearsay rule is safeguarding the opportunity for cross-examination.33
Modernly, we limit the scope of the definition of hearsay to assertive
statements.34 That limitation generally excludes exclamatory, imperative, and
interrogatory sentences from the definition:

30. LEMPERT ET AL., supra note 17, at ch. 7; PRATER ET AL., supra note 21, at ch. 15;
ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 18, at ch. 7.
31. Please pardon the weak pun.
32. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 18, at ch. 6; RICE & KATRIEL, supra note 18, at
ch. 6; ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 18, at ch. 9; WALTZ & PARK, supra note 15, at ch. 9;
WELLBORN, supra note 18, at ch. 4.
33. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 245, at 94–95 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999).
34. FED. R. EVID. 801(a).
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The justification for the [hearsay] rule is guaranteeing the opposing party an
opportunity to cross-examine to expose latent weaknesses in sincerity,
perception, memory, or narration. Certain types of sentences are usually
immune to such weaknesses. For example, if upon observing [a] collision . . .
a bystander utters the exclamation “My God!”, there is little reason to be
concerned about latent weaknesses in testimonial qualities. Realistically, this
type of statement is not testable by cross-examination; there is ordinarily no
serious question about the person’s perception or memory when the testimony
takes the form of an exclamatory, imperative, or interrogatory sentence.35

Similarly, the hearsay definition does not encompass testimony about out-ofcourt statements when the statement is logically relevant for a nonhearsay
purpose, that is, on a theory of logical relevance that does not depend on the
truth of the assertion for its probative worth.36 Again, that restriction on the
scope of the definition is traceable to cross-examination policy. When the
statement is relevant regardless of its truth, there is no need to cross-examine
the out-of-court declarant.37 On a nonhearsay theory such as a verbal act, it is
logically relevant that the statement was made; and for that purpose, it is
sufficient to afford the opposing attorney an opportunity to question the incourt witness who heard the statement.
The student will grasp the cross-examination policy underlying the
definition of hearsay much more readily if he or she has already been exposed
to the topic of competency of witnesses. At common law, to be a competent
witness, a person had to possess four testimonial qualities: perception,
memory, narrative ability, and sincerity.38 The common law imposed those
requirements because it viewed those qualities as the most fundamental
determinants of the reliability of a witness’s testimony. Of course, the value of
cross-examination lies in its ability to expose “latent weaknesses”39 in those
qualities, which were not evident during the witness’s direct examination. If
the student has already studied the competency standards, the student can
discern that cross-examination is a tool for revealing a witness’s deficiencies
with respect to the most fundamental guarantees of the trustworthiness of the
witness’s testimony.
Moreover, in studying the definition of hearsay, it is an advantage if the
student has already learned not only that there were common-law competency
criteria but that those criteria were rather lax.40 As the Advisory Committee’s
Note accompanying Federal Rule of Evidence 601 observes, “few witnesses”

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

CARLSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 435.
FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
CARLSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 441.
1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 33, § 62, at 245–46.
CARLSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 435.
1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 33, § 62, at 247.
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were disqualified under the common-law standards.41 If expert testimony
clearly established that the prospective witness was suffering from retrograde
amnesia that affected the time period of the relevant events, the witness might
be ruled incompetent. However, if the person’s recollection was merely very
hazy, the trial judge is likely to overrule any objection and hold that the
witness’s deficiencies cut to the weight of the witness’s testimony rather than
rendering the witness altogether incompetent. In other words, even at common
law the competency standards did not screen out all witnesses with serious
deficiencies in perception, memory, narrative ability, or sincerity. Even if
there was grave doubt about the prospective witness’s testimonial qualities, in
all probability the person would be permitted to take the witness stand. If the
student realizes that persons with severe deficiencies in their testimonial
qualities are routinely allowed to testify, the student will view the chance to
cross-examine as all the more critical. In turn, that view will help the students
understand why cross-examination policy largely dictates the various elements
of the definition of hearsay.
B.

The Authentication of Evidence

The first element in defining hearsay is that the testimony must concern an
assertive out-of-court statement.42 Federal Rule of Evidence 801(a) provides:
“A ‘statement’ is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a
person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.”43
Introducing the student to the authentication doctrine before discussing
hearsay assists the student in mastering this element of the hearsay definition.
What is the authentication doctrine, and how does one go about determining
whether an item of evidence is authentic? In the final analysis, authentication
is not establishing that an item of evidence is what it purports to be but, rather,
proving that the item is what the proponent claims it to be.44 By way of
example, consider a forgery prosecution. Suppose that at trial, the prosecutor
proffers the alleged forged document. The last thing that the prosecutor wants
to do is to prove that the document is what it purports to be. The document
might purport to be a genuine promissory note. If the prosecutor proved that
the document was what it purported to be, the prosecutor would prove himself
or herself out of court and establish the accused’s innocence. Under the
substantive law of forgery the prosecutor has to claim that the document is not
what it purports to be, and the prosecutor may have to offer foundational
testimony such as a questioned document analysis45 to prove up the claim. Of

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

FED. R. EVID. 601 Advisory Committee’s Note.
FED. R. EVID. 801(a).
Id.
FED. R. EVID. 901(a).
FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(3).
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course, even in these cases the proponent’s analysis begins by studying the
facial aspect of the evidence. In order to prove forgery, the prosecutor must
demonstrate that the writing has a certain facial appearance due to the
defendant’s forgery.
In more typical cases, the starting point for authentication analysis, careful
examination of the facial aspect of the item of evidence, is even more
important; this examination is both the starting point and the terminus of the
analysis. The proponent usually claims that the item is what it purports to be.
To determine the item’s purport, the proponent must subject the facial aspect
of the item to a painstaking analysis. In many instances, the authentication of a
writing boils down to proof of the document’s authorship. Who is the
purported author of the writing? Was the writing purportedly issued by the
parent corporation or a subsidiary?46 In some instances, the proponent
attempts to establish the authorship of an unsigned writing by proving that the
contents of the writing disclose information known only to the claimed
author.47 When the proponent relies on this authentication technique, the
proponent must closely scrutinize the facial aspect of the writing: Precisely
what information does the writing contain?
Most Evidence coursebooks cover the authentication doctrine after
hearsay.48 However, covering authentication before hearsay can help the
students learn how to determine whether an out-of-court statement is assertive.
In most cases, the key to making the determination is painstaking analysis of
the facial aspect of the out-of-court statement. The analysis is strikingly
parallel to the analysis in authentication.
As in authentication, the starting point is a careful study of the face of the
out-of-court statement. For the most part, exclamatory, imperative, and
interrogatory statements fall outside the scope of the hearsay definition
because, as previously stated, they cannot meaningfully be tested by crossexamination.49 On their face, these types of sentences usually do not declare
any fact that is susceptible of being true or false.50
46. FED. R. EVID. 803(6). That distinction could determine whether the witness called to lay
the authentication foundation is a “qualified witness” within the intendment of that expression in
this subsection of Rule 803.
47. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4) (“contents”); 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 33, §
225, at 49.
48. FISHER, supra note 19, ch. 10; MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, EVIDENCE: AN INTRODUCTORY
PROBLEM APPROACH, ch. 10 (2002); GREEN & NESSON, supra note 19, ch. 9; MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 18, ch. 13; RICE & KATRIEL, supra note 18, ch. 7; ROTHSTEIN ET AL.,
supra note 18, ch. 15; WELLBORN, supra note 18, ch. 6.
49. United States v. Wright, 343 F.3d 849, 865 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[A] question is typically not
hearsay because it does not assert the truth or falsity of a fact. A question merely seeks answers
and usually has no factual content.”); United States v. Daniels, 48 F. App’x. 409, 412 (3d Cir.
2002) (“[T]he federal courts of appeal are in agreement that interrogative statements cannot
constitute hearsay because they do not assert the existence of facts . . . .”); Servants of the
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The parallel to authentication analysis continues, though. As we have
seen, in some authentication cases an examination of the facial aspect of the
item of evidence does not conclude the analysis. In the forgery prosecution,
the prosecutor begins by subjecting the purported promissory note to that mode
of analysis; but the prosecutor must go beyond the face of the exhibit to
develop the claim that the writing is a forgery. For purposes of hearsay
analysis, the starting rule of thumb is that purportedly exclamatory, imperative,
and interrogatory sentences are not hearsay assertions. However, as in
authentication analysis, the hearsay analyst must sometimes go beyond the
facial aspect of the out-of-court statement to make the threshold determination
of whether the out-of-court statement is hearsay. Ultimately, the question is
whether the statement that the proponent is eliciting is functionally a
declarative assertion.51 Assume, for example, that in a drug prosecution, the
prosecutor called a percipient witness to a drug transaction. The prosecutor
attempts to elicit the witness’s testimony that one of the alleged drug
traffickers said, “Hand me the baggie of marijuana.” On its face, the sentence
is imperative, not declarative; the declarant is ordering the listener to perform
an act. However, what the prosecutor is really interested in is the elliptical
assertion embedded in the imperative sentence: “[T]he baggie [contains]
marijuana.” At trial, the prosecutor might not even try to elicit the complete
sentence. Rather, the prosecutor might ask: “How did Ms. Folsom describe the
bag that she pointed to?” The only words the prosecutor is interested in are
“the baggie of marijuana.”
While studying authentication, the student learns the importance of
pausing to painstakingly analyze the facial aspect of the item of evidence.
Concededly, in some cases, that is not the end of the analysis; but it is always
the starting point. The student can profitably apply that same lesson in hearsay
analysis. To decide whether the out-of-court statement is hearsay, once again
the student ought to begin by carefully examining the facial aspect of the
evidence. As under authentication, that examination may not be the end of the
analysis; but it should always be the starting point. A student who has already
learned the value of facial analysis in authentication should be able to more
quickly discern its parallel importance under the hearsay doctrine.

Paraclete, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 866 F. Supp. 1560, 1567 (D.N.M. 1994) (“[I]nquiries are
not hearsay because . . . they are not assertions.”); CARLSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 435. See
generally Roger C. Park, “I Didn’t Tell Them Anything About You”: Implied Assertions as
Hearsay Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 MINN. L. REV. 783 (1990).
50. Craig v. State, 630 N.E.2d 207, 211 (Ind. 1994).
51. CARLSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 436.
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C. Logical Relevance, Including Non-character Theories of Logical
Relevance
There is virtual unanimity that the Evidence teacher should introduce the
students to the concept of logical relevance before turning to hearsay.52 That is
certainly a sound sequence. After deciding that the out-of-court statement is
assertive, the student must next resolve the question under Federal Rule 801(c)
of whether the testimony about the statement is being offered for a hearsay
purpose, that is, to prove the truth of the assertion. Of course, that question is
simply another way of asking whether the proponent is offering the testimony
on a theory of logical relevance which requires an assumption of the truth of
the assertion. The student cannot intelligently address the Rule 801(c)
question unless he or she understands logical relevance under Rule 401.
However, there is a particular application of the logical relevance doctrine
that is strikingly parallel to the logical relevance component of hearsay
analysis: the determination of whether evidence of uncharged misconduct
proffered under Federal Rule 404(b) possesses genuine non-character logical
relevance. In pertinent part, Rule 404(b) reads:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident . . . .53

The first sentence of the statute codifies the traditional character evidence
prohibition. That sentence forbids the proponent from (1) offering testimony
about a person’s other misdeeds to prove the person’s propensity or disposition
for misconduct and (2) then inferring that on the occasion in question, the
person acted “in character,” consistently with his or her character trait.
However, the second sentence allows the proponent to introduce the evidence
so long as he or she can point to a tenable theory of non-character logical
relevance. Every federal court of appeals has construed the second sentence as
codifying the inclusionary conception of the uncharged misconduct doctrine.
By virtue of that conception of the doctrine, the proponent may rely on any
noncharacter theory even if it is not one of the enumerated theories such as
“motive.”54 Thus, in studying Rule 404(b), the student quickly learns that
there is a huge reward for imaginative logical relevance analysis. If the
proponent is creative enough to articulate a non-character theory of logical
52. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 17, ch. 3; FISHER, supra note 19, chs. 1–3; GRAHAM, supra
note 48, ch. 2; GREEN & NESSON, supra note 19, ch. 2; MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note
18, ch. 2; RICE & KATRIEL, supra note 18, ch. 2; ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 18, ch. 2; WALTZ
& PARK, supra note 15, ch. 2.
53. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
54. 1 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 2:31 (2003).
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relevance, the proponent can ordinarily easily defeat a character evidence
objection.
Of course, there is a direct parallel to hearsay analysis under Rule 801(c).
If the proponent offers the out-of-court statement on a theory of logical
relevance requiring an assumption of the truth of the assertion, the proponent
walks right into a hearsay objection. However, when the proponent is
imaginative enough to find an alternative theory of logical relevance, the
proponent can turn aside the hearsay objection. Rule 404(b) analysis teaches
the student the practical value of wracking one’s brain to develop multiple
theories of logical relevance. If the student comes to Rule 801(c) analysis with
that mindset, the student is much more likely to work harder to find viable
nonhearsay theories. As previously stated, modern Evidence coursebooks
broach the general topic of logical relevance before taking up the hearsay
doctrine.55 However, several of them delay a consideration of non-character
theories until after the discussion of the hearsay doctrine.56 Reversing that
sequence would ensure that even before studying the Rule 801(c) component
of the hearsay definition, the student has begun to form a mindset to develop
multiple theories of logical relevance for an item of evidence. The student
would already know that doing so is the best method of defeating a character
evidence objection. The student can then more readily understand that this is
also often the most effective method of surmounting a hearsay objection.
D. The Best Evidence Rule
If the teacher covers witness competency early, the student will have a
better appreciation of the cross-examination policy which helps shape the
definition of hearsay. By studying authentication, the student learns the
importance of facial analysis that is so critical under Rule 801(a). Next, if he
or she has already studied non-character theories of logical relevance, the
student will come to the study of Rule 801(c) with an understanding of the
practical importance of identifying multiples theories of logical relevance.
Sequencing the course to cover those topics early should shorten the student’s
learning curve on the challenge of determining whether testimony is
nonhearsay. However, there is one other topic that the teacher ought to
seriously consider covering before hearsay: the best evidence rule. The overall
flow of best evidence analysis is quite analogous to the sequence of hearsay
analysis. If the teacher exposes the student to the flow of best evidence
analysis before turning to hearsay, the student should find it much easier to
grasp the sequence of hearsay analysis. The vast majority of Evidence
55. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
56. GRAHAM, supra note 48, ch. 9; LEONARD & GOLD, supra note 18, ch. 4; ROTHSTEIN ET
AL., supra note 18, ch. 8; WALTZ & PARK, supra note 15, ch. 4; WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note
17, ch. 5.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2006]

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE EVIDENCE COURSE

1059

coursebooks discuss the best evidence rule after the hearsay doctrine,57 but
there is a strong case for reversing that sequence.
Consider the series of questions that the student must grapple with in order
to assess a best evidence objection:
First, the student must address the what question: What evidence is the
proponent offering, and does that evidence relate to a “writing” under Federal
Rule 1001(1)? If the testimony does not relate to documentary subject-matter,
the trial judge overrules the objection.
Second, assuming that the testimony relates to a writing, the student must
consider the why question: Is the proponent offering the testimony “[t]o prove
the content of [the] writing” under Rule 1002? The proponent can offer
testimony to prove the existence, execution, or delivery of a writing without
triggering the best evidence rule.58 So long as the proponent can advance a
theory of logical relevance that does not necessitate proof of the contents of the
writing, the best evidence rule does not come into play.
Of course, when the testimony relates to a writing and the proponent’s
purpose is proving the contents of the writing, the best evidence rule is
triggered. The general procedural consequence is that the proponent must
produce the writing. However, there are exceptional situations in which the
proponent can dispense with the writing. In those situations, the proponent
must do two things: (1) establish an excuse for the non-production of the
writing;59 and (2) offer an acceptable type of secondary evidence such as a
certified copy of a public record60 or the testimony of a witness who previously
read the reading and presently recalls its substance.61 The excuse for nonproduction establishes the necessity for resorting to the secondary evidence,
and the testimony about the secondary evidence demonstrates its authenticity
or reliability. In other words, the common denominators in these exceptional
situations are the factors of necessity and reliability.
The flow of hearsay analysis is essentially the same. As in best evidence
analysis, initially the student poses the what question: Does the testimony
relate to an out-of-court assertion? If that question is answered in the
affirmative, the student next takes up the why question: Why is the proponent
offering this testimony? What is the proponent’s theory of logical relevance?
Does that theory require the assumption of the truth of the assertion? When
57. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 17, ch. 9; CARLSON ET AL., supra note 10, ch. 24; FISHER,
supra note 19, ch. 10; GRAHAM, supra note 48, ch. 7; GREEN & NESSON, supra note 19, ch. 9;
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 18, ch. 14; RICE & KATRIEL, supra note 18, ch. 7;
ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 18, ch. 15; WALTZ & PARK, supra note 15, ch. 8; WELLBORN,
supra note 18, ch. 7.
58. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 33, § 233, at 66.
59. FED. R. EVID. 1004.
60. FED. R. EVID. 1005.
61. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 33, § 241, at 83.
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testimony relates to a writing and the proponent is offering the testimony to
prove the contents of the writing, the best evidence rule comes into play,
generally mandating that the proponent produce the writing in court. Its
production enables the jury to read the writing with its own two eyes. When
testimony relates to an assertion and the proponent is attempting to introduce
the testimony to establish the truth of the assertion, the hearsay rule comes into
play, generally mandating that the proponent produce the declarant in court.
The production of the declarant in court enables the jurors to hear the witness’s
statements with their own ears and simultaneously to gauge the witness’s
honesty and intelligence.
Just as the preference for the original writing in best evidence sometimes
yields, allowing the proponent to introduce secondary evidence, the preference
for the declarant’s production can give way, permitting the proponent to
introduce testimony about an out-of-court assertion under a hearsay exception.
In the final analysis, the policy rationale for the recognition of most hearsay
exceptions is the same as the justification for the admission of secondary
evidence under the best evidence: a combination of the factors of necessity and
reliability. One of the most important insights underlying Dean Wigmore’s
synthesis of hearsay doctrine was that those factors rationalized the vast
majority of the recognized hearsay exceptions.62 The upshot is that drilling the
students on the sequence of best evidence analysis is excellent preparation for
employing essentially the same sequence of analysis required by the hearsay
doctrine.
V. CONCLUSION
It is understandable that so many Evidence teachers cover hearsay
relatively early in their course. It makes administrative sense to get the largest
instructional block out of the way early. Moreover, there is a certain eagerness
to get to hearsay quickly because of the exciting, related constitutional law
controversies.
However, the fundamental question is which sequence of coverage makes
the most sense pedagogically. The premise of this Article is that the most
daunting challenge for the Evidence teacher is to help students develop the
analytic skill of differentiating between hearsay and nonhearsay. On that
premise, it may be wiser to position the hearsay rule a bit later in the course.
More specifically, before taking up the hearsay rule, it seems advisable to
cover topics which will give the students understandings and skills that will
later enable them to more effectively meet the challenge of identifying
nonhearsay.

62. 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1420, at 202–03 (3d ed. 1940).
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As previously stated, prior exposure to the common law criteria for witness
competency teaches the students the fundamental importance of crossexamination policy. Understanding this policy enables students to better
appreciate the contours of the definition of hearsay. When they apply that
definition, the students must initially inquire whether the out-of-court
statement is assertive. Their best starting point for this step is painstaking
examination of the facial aspect of the testimony—a skill they learn in
studying the authentication doctrine. The student’s next step in applying the
definition is identifying all the possible theories of logical relevance for the
evidence and deciding whether every theory requires an assumption of the
truth of the assertion. If even one theory of logical relevance does not entail
that assumption, there is an available nonhearsay theory that can overcome a
hearsay objection. Lastly, if the testimony falls within the hearsay definition,
the student must search for an applicable hearsay exception founded on
reliability and necessity. The overall sequence of hearsay analysis is strikingly
similar to the flow of best evidence analysis, and the student may be more
comfortable following the flow of hearsay analysis if he or she has already
mastered the best evidence rule.
The point of this Article is not to recommend one coursebook over any
other.63 A professor using a particular coursebook does not have to begin on
page one and mechanically cover the pages in order. The professor can vary
the sequence. Whenever I have used a coursebook, I have always deviated
from the order of the chapters. The point of this Article simply relates to the
sequence of the class discussions. Again, my assumption is that the thorniest
pedagogical problem for the Evidence teacher is helping the students identify
nonhearsay. The reader’s experience might well be different. If the reader has
found another aspect of the Evidence course to be more troublesome, the
reader can summarily dismiss this Article. However, during the past thirty
years, my conversations with colleagues, students, and judges lead me to
conclude that many share my belief that differentiating between hearsay and
nonhearsay is the most difficult challenge for our students. If that belief is
correct, to a significant degree the Evidence course ought to be sequenced to
better equip our students to meet that challenge. To borrow a phrase from
Simonides, “[t]he chief aid” in teaching nonhearsay can be the right “order.”64

63. I must confess that in one respect, even the coursebook which I co-author does not
follow the sequence recommended in this Article. In our coursebook, the chapters on the hearsay
doctrine precede the single chapter devoted to the best evidence rule. See CARLSON ET AL., supra
note 10.
64. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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